is the modern explanation that one will find in many books. But throughout history, most of the predecessors of central banks were given monopoly over note issuing (and thus money creation) and other advantages in return for financing the public debt. Even more important, the monetary privileges were given to private entities that did operate to their own profits, independent of the government's control. Starting with the process of debasement, governments discovered the power of inflation, money creation and debt monetization -inflation meant seigniorage profits, lower real debt etc., and a form of taxation that could hardly be avoided -and wished to use it to their own benefit. Slowly, they gained a certain degree of control by renewing the banks' charter on condition they purchase government bonds (as in the case of Bank of England or Banque de France, Goodhart (1989) ).
The First World War showed that governments used their central banks to finance the war through inflationary monetary policy. As a result, the new central banks that were established and many of the old ones that were reorganized complied with the programme of reconstruction discussed at the Brussels and Genoa conferences. The latter contained the proposal that independent central banks against government be established. In Whale's (1939) words: "Largely the object may be said to have been to restore the status quo ante bellum." The League of Nations applied the scheme in Europe, while various personalities advocated it on other continents. The concept of independent central bank was also incorporated in text books such as the one of Kisch and Elkin.
The Great Depression and World War II brought an end to the idea of central bank autonomy. Governments took over monetary policy in times of intense crisis and the spreading of socialism, interventionism, as well as the success of Keynesianism had a major contribution to the changing status of central banks -most of them became state-owned or statecontrolled. During the inflations of the 1960s to 1980s the idea did return, that a central bank less influenced by government would maintain a lower inflation rate.
The modern rationale for central banking (i.e. supply a public good, etc.) came afterwards and many monetary authorities have been established in the 20th century based on those grounds and on the institutional trend in the entire world. In Capie's view (2009), today's modern central banks have adjusted to the environmental changes around them and the more newly established ones have been designed under the supervision of the state. As "creatures of the state", central banks' relationships with the governments in different countries have been shaped not only by legislation, but also by history, tradition and personalities heading them, having an impact on their institutional design (Siklos, 2002) . Thus, the role played by central banks and their performance is highly influenced by politics.
Leaving aside the fact that in most of the industrialized countries the seigniorage profits go to the state (Siklos, 2002) , the government and the central bank each operate crucial public policies (which can have enormous impact on the economy) -the fiscal policy, and, respectively, the monetary policy. The two are linked through the government sector's budget constraint, according to Walsh (2003) . A clear distinction between the two above has been intentionally made in the pursuit of emphasizing the separation between them. Although some central banks are part of the government, in the 1990s a widely developed and discussed concept has re-emerged: central bank independence. It is seen as an institutional arrangement that could have as a result the reduction of high and persistent inflation (Cukierman, 2008 
Central bank independence definition
Central bank independence can be generically defined as the right to conduct monetary policy without being contested by or having to consult with the government (Capie, 1995) . Others (Bordo, 2008) see it as the "noncooperation between fiscal and monetary authorities in policy implementation". For Blinder (1998) it means that "the central bank has freedom to decide how to pursue its goals" and "its decisions are very hard for any other branch of the government to reverse". In Walsh's words (2008) , "Central Bank Independence refers to the freedom of monetary policymakers from direct political or governmental influence in the conduct of policy". But Siklos (2002) makes an important observation: central bank autonomy can only occur within government and fiscal and monetary policy cannot be entirely separated. Furthermore, he considers monetary policy as a joint responsibility of both central banks and governments. Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) record the first attempts to assess the usefulness of an autonomous monetary authority in Friedman's work at the beginning of the 1960s 2 , where central bank autonomy in relation to the government is similar to the one between the judiciary and the government. Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) find throughout the literature review, that the concept is given three directions: independence in matters that relate to personnel 3 , financial independence 4 and policy independencewith respect to goals (whether a central bank decides which are the final goals of the monetary policy or not) and with respect to instruments (whether the central bank can use whatever means it finds most appropriate in order to achieve its goal(s) or not).
Hence, one may conclude that central bank independence involves more or less the conduct of monetary policy without the interference of politicians. But the need for central bank autonomy happened as a consequence of mistrust in politicians, and thus governments, to operate the monetary policy to the benefit of society and to operate the fiscal policy in a disciplined manner. Several theoretical and empirical studies demonstrated that politicians have short-term plans and seek to bust the economy before elections in order to be reelected -by controlling monetary policy and inflating the economy they can give the impression that the economy is prospering during their end of term. Even in the absence of political cycles, the temptation is to behave opportunistically and reach for short-term gains at the expense of the future. But an independent central bank would assure a low inflation. Therefore the recommendations comprised that an autonomous institution be founded that could outcast the political influence, by considering the long term, and were included in national legislation. Also, because the public and the governments have little patience, this monetary authority would be given independence in such a manner as to credibly pursuit price stability on the long run.
The fundamentals supporting the modern concept of central bank independence are considered to be the time-inconsistency models of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) . The first two reached the conclusion that private agents and policymakers are influenced in their decision-making by expected future policies and reactions to them. As a result, choosing the best decision given a current situation delivers suboptimal results or even economic instability over a longer period of time. That is why (predictable) rules are better than discretionary policy. Barro and Gordon (1983) cheat when people anticipate the rule. They demonstrated that obtaining a low inflation contributes to building a reputation which will be later used by policymakers in order to achieve a surprisingly high inflation. The above theory brought to light the inflationary bias and, thus, the sub-optimal high inflation that the government delivers. This doesn't mean that central bank independence didn't exist before. As we have seen, central banks were private and independent until the 20th century, they came under the control of the government by the mid of the 20th century and the concern for independence and price stability re-emerged latter on in the 20th century. Rogoff (1985) completed the theory by explaining why so many countries had instituted independent central banks headed by conservative governors in recent years. His model demonstrated that society will be better of if a 'conservative' central banker is in charge of monetary policy -meaning that he or she puts greater weight on inflation stabilization to the detriment of employment stabilization than society does 5 . This would lead to a lower level of inflation, with smaller social costs. But the appointment of a conservative monetary authority was his third-best solution: the first one implied that labor market distortion be eliminated, and the second-best solution was to 'legally impose a complete state-contingent money supply rule'.
Even though the three well-known above mentioned articles did not clearly state the need of improving the autonomy of central banks, Rogoff (1985) , who considered the monetary authority to be already independent 6 did make one suggestion (the only one in the article who can be related to CBI): Eijffinger and de Haan (1996) , Berger et al (2001) , Cukierman (2008) and Hayo and Hefeker (2010) have all researched and documented a consistent literature review on the subject. The results have been somewhat inconclusive. The general consensus is that central bank independence (coupled with a clear mandate for the central bank to achieve price stability) is negatively correlated to inflation, without having any impact over output variability, at least in developed countries. The relation of causality between the two has been several times questioned, and the robustness of the previous studies reexamined. Some academics have suggested that the correlation between the two could be a result of a third factor, the culture and tradition of monetary stability -the way the public perceives and demands price stability (its social choice or national inflation culture in Hayo and Hefeker's (2010) words) and the history of institutions. The fact that the same index used to measure legal CBI does not provide significant results in the case of developing countries and that, even more, the transition countries have known higher inflation rates even though the CBI was legally increased, shows that political culture is indeed an important element in the equation. Some studies have even claimed the opposite -that there is a negative correlation between low inflation and legal independence (Hayo, Hefeker, 2010) . But research using the latest update of CBI index, which compares the evolution between 1980-1989 and 1990-2003 of central bank independence and inflation shows that there is an inverse relationship between the two variables in transition countries located in Central and Eastern Europe (Crowe, Meade 2007) .
Central Bank Independence in Romania
Romania, as former communist country, experienced a totalitarian regime based on central planning. After the fall of communism it struggled to organize itself as a democracy and to develop a marketoriented economy. Its central bank, the National Bank of Romania (NBR herein), has known several reforms and its charter changed accordingly in January 1991, in May 1998 and in June 2004. Using a central bank independence (CBI) index for measuring legal independence of central banks (CWN herein) developed by Cukierman et al. (1992) and consulting several specialised articles that provide valuable historical data (Cukierman et al., 1992; Neyapti 2001; Crowe and Meade, 2007) we reach the conclusion that legal independence of the NBR has considerably increased (Fig.1) 
Central Bank Independence and Performance
Over a long period of time, it would seem that inflation has been well fought against once the independence of the NBR has been increased (Fig.2) . No need to mention that during communism all prices were controlled, therefore the inflation was nearly zero in those times. The transition from a planned economy to a marketoriented one was unsurprisingly accompanied by high inflation with two peaks -one in 1993 (256%) and in 1997 (154.8%). Starting with 1998, Romania registered falling two-digit inflation and after 2004 it remained at one-digit inflation. The performance was accredited to the new Law no. 312/2004 which increased the independence of the NBR, and to the introduction of direct inflation targeting in August 2005.
Fig.2: Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Romania
Only after the inflation targeting regime had become the monetary policy strategy of the NBR, did the inflation decline to a one-digit number. The targets were set after consulting with the Romanian government. Still, NBR's performance in hitting the target is somewhat inconclusive (Fig.3) . Most of the time NBR missed the target (6 out of 8 years) and inflation often recorded levels outside the variation band (Lower and Upper Limit).
The literature on the subject of central bank independence concludes that higher central bank independence will be conducive to lower inflation and lower inflation variability in the case of developed countries. The above figure shows that, although NBR has de jure independence, uncertainty still reigns in Romania when it comes to inflation. An explanation may be that, as many studies researched, the CWN is not illustrative for the degree of de facto central bank independence in developing countries. A measure of central bank independence meant to illustrate de facto independence is the turnover rate of central bank governors (Cukierman et al., 1992) . In the case of Romania, one may not decide on its level as the NBR governor has been Mugur 
Central Bank Independence and Credibility
Siklos (2008) takes into consideration core elements that define CBI, one of them being a proxy for monetary policy credibility materialized in accumulated inflation forecast errors. He uses data from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) to evaluate on an annual basis the inflation forecast errors based on the following formula:
The authors follow the same methodology for the period 2005-2012 and reach an interesting conclusion. During 1991 During -2004 , when the NBR was more dependent on the government, the accumulated inflation forecast errors rose to 3.88 points. In comparison, for the years 2005-2012, when the NBR was allegedly less dependent on the public authority and its legal independence increased considerably, the same proxy for credibility of monetary policy was 11.059 points.
The conclusion may be that while the NBR increased its de jure independence, the delivered inflation deviated from the forecasts more severely as compared to its past, contrary to expectations and theoretically harming its credibility. Still, the National Bank of Romania finds itself on the first place when it comes to trustRomanians do not trust the government and its institution, nor the parliament or the judicial. Instead, the NBR is highly regarded as being a solid, uncorrupted and trustworthy institution, in spite of its poor performance.
NBR's Monetary Policy
The direct inflation targeting regime adopted by NBR offers a framework for monetary policy in which the central bank uses its instruments in order to maintain the inflation in the variation band. As we have seen in a previous section, NBR has had a poor performance in achieving the targeted inflation. Plus, having more legal independence has meant accumulating even more errors of deviation from the forecasted inflation. Or, the other way round, it may be that the high de jure independence isn't doubled by a high de facto independence. Instead, it would seem that the National Bank of Romania is closely following the exchange rate EUR/RON and making its monetary policy decisions according to the evolution of the exchange rate (ER) as Fig.6 shows. In other words, monetary policy instruments could be defined in a simple equation as MPIt =α+β (πt -πtarget) + µ (ERt -ERtarget) + ε
If we eliminated the exchange rate variables, β would be close to zero, meaning that inflation is actually statistically insignificant for the monetary policy instruments; a strange result for a central bank that officially undertook a direct inflation targeting regime.
Fig.6: Exchange rate EUR/RON versus Monetary Aggregate M1

Conclusions: NBR and Government Borrowing
Leaving aside the fundamental objective of price stability, another purpose of an independent central bank is to conduct its activities with a small regard to government policy objectives, as long as they don't conflict with the central bank's main objective of maintaining price stability. Romania has a long history of corruption and irresponsible governments after the fall of communism. Therefore, the main interest is that NBR act as less dependently of the public authorities as possible. The main public perception is that NBR is a highly independent central bank, but a more critical point of view may reveal a slightly different situation.
In the first years after the fall of communism, the central bank used to lend the government when in need, in the limit of 10% of expected government expenditure. institutions and the amounts of the latter bid for government securities. The National Bank of Romania must certainly know that it indirectly finances the Romanian government. In 2012, when Romania experienced 3 new governments with serious problems of financing its public spending, NBR conducted weekly repo operations, as compared to previous years, when open market operations were noticeably less used.
Fig.8: Government Securities versus Repo operations in 2012 (2) (mil RON)
In conclusion, it may seem that the Romanian central bank substantially increased its legal central bank independence in the last years, managing to improve its performance in fighting inflation as well. This doesn't come as a surprise, as NBR has to comply with the Euro system provisions. The success in reducing inflation may be awarded to the adoption of a direct inflation targeting regime, but inflation variability is still present.
A certain curiosity arises from the fact that NBR, together with its governor, is the most credible institution in Romania (and the most credible public personality), despite its failure to achieve the target inflation rates and the objective of price stability. Rather, it seems more focused on the evolution of the exchange rate, which concerns other public authorities also. The NBR has managed to maintain its high reputation by furthering the idea that monetary policy is a complicated subject, entrusted to experts and kept out of politics, incapable of being judged by non experts. The absence of certain available public information, as well as the incomprehensible conduct of monetary policy (it officially targets inflation as primary objective, but in fact is more exchange rates sensitive) may come to confirm the previous observation.
NBR longstanding governor and the recent evolution of government debt, correlated with open market operations, may raise doubts regarding NBR's de facto independence. As Friedman (1962) 
